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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9871
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0037
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0151
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0003
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0014
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0060
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2941
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2144
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4841
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2403
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C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001600

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR TFGG01, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/RUS
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018

TAGS: UNSC PREL ID GG RS

SUBJECT: GEORGIA -- REVIEWING POINTS RE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH OSSETIA WITH INDONESIA

REF: A. STATE 90980
B. STATE 90978
C. JAKARTA 1590
D. STATE 89769
E. JAKARTA 1532

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY -- Mission has reviewed Ref B points with the GOI regarding Abkhazia/South Ossetia. Pol/C underscored that Russian recognition of the two entities as separate countries would be a serious mistake, setting a dangerous precedent that would lead to further instability. Department of Foreign Affairs contact took USG points on board. Worried about its own territorial integrity, we think that Indonesia would ultimately strongly oppose any effort by Russia to recognize the two separatist regions. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) REVIEWING LATEST POINTS -- Pol/C reviewed Ref B points with Indonesian contacts on August 25, including with contacts in the President's Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Indonesian legislature. Pol/C underlined that the GOI should urge Russia not to recognize the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Pol/C noted that doing so would only further inflame tensions in an already unstable region. Pol/C emphasized that the move would amount to the using of military force to try to redraw post-Soviet boundaries and undermine the territorial integrity of one of Russia's neighbors.

¶3. (C) Pol/C stressed that Kosovo was a unique case and not a precedent for any other conflict. Unlike in Kosovo, there is no UN-sanctioned international administration in the two regions. There are no security guarantees to protect the different ethnic communities and Russia has not helped create the conditions for the return of refugees. All in all, Russia has failed to use available avenues to bring resolution to this matter.

¶4. (SBU) Pol/C also reviewed Ref A points related to Russia's spurious claims re the ceasefire agreement.

¶5. (C) GOI RESPONSE -- Bunyan Saptomo, the Director of the

Americas Desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs, took our points on board. He noted that any effort by Russia to recognize the two separatist regions would be a mistake and agreed that it would make the situation worse. That said, the GOI needed to review the matter more closely. The Department of Foreign Affairs looked forward to further consultations on the matter in New York.

¶6. (C) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY KEY FOR GOI -- A key concern for Indonesia is the country's very own territorial integrity in light of the historical problems it has had in such places as Aceh and elsewhere. This is one of the key reasons that Indonesia has not yet recognized the independent status of Kosovo, for example (despite the desire of some local Muslim groups that it do so).

¶7. (C) Given this, we think that Indonesia would ultimately strongly oppose any effort by Russia to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As we lobby Indonesia on Georgia-related matters, it is important that we continue to distinguish between the two situations, so we do not undermine our effort to get them on board re Kosovo.

HUME